add the ecdhe definition, this has not been reviewed yet..

PROTOCOL.md

@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ states.  This is safe as it is assumed that the initiator will not
 initiate a new key negotiation unless it wants it's previous session
 to be removed.
 
+The notation below has an implicite recv on the other side of each
+message.  It is left off for conciseness, but must be done and verified,
+in the case of static data, like `reqreset`, before any of their
+respective operations are done.
+
 ### shared
 
 Both sides initalize:
@@ -88,6 +93,81 @@ initiator to send any commands it needs to be "passed back".
 
 At this point, the new key/session becomes active.
 
+### ecdhe
+
+This is the ECDHE key exchange.  This does an ephemeral key exchange
+w/ a known static key.  It follows a protocol similar to the KK
+[handshake pattern](https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#interactive-handshake-patterns-fundamental)
+of Noise.  For reference, it is:
+```
+KK:
+  -> s
+  <- s
+  ...
+  -> e, es, ss
+  <- e, ee, se
+```
+
+It requires that both sides know the public key of the other side (and
+obviously their own).
+
+Both start out:
+```
+meta-AD('com.funkthat.lora.irrigation.ecdhe.v0.0.1')
+key(<initiator pub key> || <responder pub key>)
+```
+
+This is done to both bind the session to this specific public key pair,
+but to also hide the negotiation request.
+
+The terminology used is the same as used in [Noise's Overview of
+handshake state machine](https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#overview-of-handshake-state-machine).
+
+Note: MixHash calls are unnecessary, as they are inherent in the
+send_enc operations.
+
+The initiator generates an ephemeral key, e.
+
+initiator:
+```
+send_enc(e + 'reqreset')	# ephemeral
+send_mac(8)
+key(DH(e, rs) + DH(s, rs))
+```
+
+The respondent generates an ephemeral key, e.
+
+respondent:
+```
+key(DH(s, re) + DH(s, rs))
+send_enc(e)	# ephermal
+send_mac(8)
+key(DH(e, re) + DH(e, rs))
+```
+
+initiator:
+```
+key(DH(e, re) + DH(s, re))
+send_enc('confirm')
+send_mac(8)
+```
+
+respondent:
+```
+send_enc('confirmed')
+send_mac(8)
+```
+
+It seems odd to respond to the confirm message, BUT, as using strobe
+requires explicit hand off (similar to a token), in order for the
+initiator to send any commands it needs to be "passed back".
+
+It is easy to see that there are correct matching key operations on
+each side, and as the key operation ratchets the state, a separate
+ratchet operation is not needed as in the shared key state.
+
+At this point, the new key/session becomes active.
+
 Command Phase
 -------------